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Flooding is an inherently uncertain hydrometeorological phenomenon. 
When it occurs in transboundary basins, the complexity of its management is 
amplified by international treaties and needs for political accountability. Little has 
been written about FRM under the inevitable uncertainty in these transboundary 
contexts. This paper addresses this gap through an exploratory case study of a 
new FRM plan (Plan 2014) in the Great Lake Ontario and St. Lawrence River 
system in North America.  We examine the evolving nature of contemporary 
FRM towards more flexible approaches in the face of increasing uncertainty. 
When this new management plan coincided with severe transboundary flooding, 
this highlighted deep tensions, notably between upstream and downstream 
communities, expert and lay opinion, and between the planners setting rules and 
the operators using those rules. This story also showcases the complex balancing 
act faced by flood risk managers operating across national boundaries who are 
asked to contend with hydrological variability as well as public needs for 
certainty. We contend that the negotiation and agreed dispute resolution processes 
surrounding these tensions is a fundamental component of FRM in international 
basins, and one that may become ever more important as climate change further 
increases the uncertainty regarding these hydrometeorological hazards.  
 
Keywords: flooding; transboundary basins; uncertainty; strict/flexible risk 
management; lay/expert opinion; planners/operators; upstream/downstream; USA/Canada 
 
Introduction  
When water bodies are divided by international boundaries, their management 
becomes more complex. Many international systems have been created to govern these 
issues but they are almost always confronted with complexity regarding hydrological 
interdependence and the competing interests of different stakeholders. Flood risk is 
particularly difficult to mitigate in these contexts because management of the river basin 
requires cooperation across different national contexts, and between their upstream and 
downstream riparian communities. The inherent unpredictability of flooding also makes 
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its management across borders particularly problematic. Indeed, decision-makers must 
design systems that are flexible enough to account for the variation and unpredictability 
of flooding as well as juggle political needs for stable, unambiguous procedures and 
public accountability.  
On the border between Canada and the United States of America, transboundary 
water issues have been managed since the 1970s by the International Joint Commission 
(IJC), which is headed by six Commissioners, three from each country. In the past, the 
IJC has regulated transboundary water quantities through control structures such as 
dams and their strict water release rules. However, recent recognition of problems with 
this system has led to new flood risk management practices that are more flexible and 
designed to bring hydrological systems closer to their natural characteristics.  
For the Great Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence river basin, in Eastern North 
America, Plan 2014 is one such strategy devised to better manage water issues in the 
river basin, including in the operation of the Moses-Saunders dam (see below). This 
Plan was created in part to address failures in previous systems by accounting for hydro-
climatic uncertainty in the basin and promoting more natural flood regimes and 
ecological status. Years of negotiation backed with cutting-edge scientific discussions 
were required to develop this plan. Unfortunately for the IJC, two extreme flooding 
seasons occurred in the region in 2017 and 2019, following the implementation of Plan 
2014 in December 2016. This was a catalyst to debate the value of such a paradigm shift 
that illustrates the political risk of framing uncertainty in transboundary flood risk 
management (FRM), a topic that has yet to be properly discussed in academic literature. 
The new framework of Plan 2014 brought to light key issues of reconciling national 
interests with modern flood risk management practices within complex environmental 
and political contexts where lay opinions and expert judgements can sometimes be in 
conflict.  
This paper examines the issues surrounding flood risk management in 
international basins or river basins through this example, providing what we suggest to 
be one of the first analyses of uncertainty in transboundary flood risk management. The 
uncertainty we are analysing here surrounds decisions on how best to manage the Lake 
Ontario/St Lawrence system today, given the inherently unpredictable nature of 
flooding and the even greater hydrometeorological uncertainties we might expect in the 
future given climate change and urban development. Methodologically, the research 
design is one of an exploratory case study (Yin, 2009), but preceded and followed by an 
analysis of the issues in a wider international context. The information we have used in 
the case study comes from a variety of sources, including both academic and ‘grey’ 
literature such as policy reports and contemporary news articles that describe the nature 
of management decisions and the historical context in which they were made.  
Uncertainty in transboundary flood risk management 
Uncertainty is a measure of the unknown where information is lacking or 
debated (Hall, 2014). In the world of environmental discourse, there are many 
definitions of the term, stemming from two fundamental sources, notably as classified 
by Walker et al. (2003) and as used by the IJC in its logic underpinning of Plan 2014 
(Table 1). First, ontological (or variability) uncertainty exists due to the inherent 
complexity and variation of a particular environmental system. Next, epistemic 
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uncertainty is a product of imperfect information and knowledge gaps, and can 
therefore potentially be reduced through the gaining of new knowledge (van der Keur et 
al., 2008).   
 
Flood risk and uncertainty 
Flood risk and its management involve both these types of uncertainty. The two 
categories often reinforce one another and can increase over time, unpredictability 
affecting the time-scales of scientific canon and policy development (Ranger et al., 
2010). However, policy-making often requires clear, binary, solutions that have no 
room for ‘shades of grey’, in particular in situations where loss of life or damage to 
property can occur. Several ideas have been developed to guide decisions about 
unknown or uncertain outcomes, such as the precautionary principle (van Asselt & Vos, 
2006). Additionally, criteria have been developed to provide quantitative decision-
making tools such as multi-attribute theory or multicriteria analysis (MAUT or MCA) 
that allow decisions to be weighed against each other to guide and justify the choice of 
one option over another (Green & Weatherhead, 2014). However, translating 
quantitative measures of uncertainty for policy making and for the public can be 
difficult. To this end, it is necessary to build trust, greater political acceptability and 
flexible opportunities for policy change (van der Bles et al., 2019). Seminal work on the 
communication of uncertainty can provide some effective tools to this end. Notably, it 
has been argued that communication should be tailored to contexts, using local 
knowledge and involving communities through the decision-making process via close 
consultation and partnership (Basic, 2009; Chao, Hobbs & Venkatesh, 1999; Norman & 
Bakker, 2013).   
Serious flooding is generally associated with extreme weather which is uncertain 
by definition, occurring at the tail of probability distributions. Indeed, hazard 
anticipation is complex, and perfectly accurate prediction quasi-impossible (Ranger et 
al., 2010; Stainforth et al., 2007). In fact, Hall (2014, v) even states that flood risk 
management itself is ‘a process of decision making under uncertainty’. As such, flood 
managers are often forced to make decisions with incomplete or debated information 
(Green & Weatherhead, 2014); detailed uncertainty analysis in FRM, is still in its 
infancy (Chauhan & Bowles, 2001; Hall & Solomatine, 2008); additionally, Hall 
(2014:p.4) notes that this analysis ‘does not remove the need for judgement, especially 
when decisions are value-laden and contested’.   
The prospect of climate change greatly complicates hazard prediction and risk 
management by involving extremes that stretch the bounds of what are considered 
average seasonal patterns and extremes. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2012, 2014). To deal with this uncertainty, building flexibility into existing 
management plans can be an effective approach (Ranger et al., 2010). Indeed, building 
flexibility is increasingly seen as a fundamental component of resilience and climate 
change adaptation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001). This flexibility 
can be expressed through impact (instead of forecast) based policy or through water 
control structures with wider operational bounds that determine water height or flows. 
This said, flooding's inherently high levels of predictive uncertainty make it difficult to 
develop rigorous rules for decision-making and use them systematically in practice, 
despite these often being demanded by those at risk or paying for FRM investments.  
 4 
 
Transboundary flood risk management 
In this context, while international rights to water have long been established, 
flooding is still rarely found in the canon of international law (Norman & Bakker, 
2013). Indeed, according to Cooley et al. (2009), floods were the primary focus of only 
nine percent of 20th century international treaties despite the significant representation 
of transboundary flooding globally. Indeed, Bakker (2007) calculates that almost one 
tenth of all river floods in the world come under the jurisdiction of more than one 
country; and that, of the 152 countries in the world that experience flooding, around 
75% of them share these events with another country (Norman & Bakker, 2013:p.26). 
Further, between 1958 and 2005, flooding in international basins has accounted for 32% 
of all flood-related casualties in the world, around 60% of impacted individuals, and 
14% of financial damages (Bakker, 2007).  
It has been hypothesized that the lack of integration of uncertainty in 
international water management treaties and policies stems from the high political effort 
and cost this requires: these regulatory mechanisms must tread the fine line between 
being both ‘politically feasible and hydrologically effective’ (Fischhendler, 2004, 299). 
Indeed, any negotiation is predicated on clear and detailed issues on which both parties 
agree, and public accountability and trust is necessary for the acceptance of these 
treaties. This takes time. Various partners in the different countries must have a 
common understanding of risks and clear and well-publicised agreements must be 
reached on the methods and rules to manage this risk. Structural flood risk management, 
such as with the Moses-Saunders Dam, introduces an additional dynamic that lies 
between those who design rules and regulations (here we term these ‘the planners’), and 
those who execute them (‘the operators’). Managing uncertainty therefore becomes a 
shared responsibility between these two sets of actors.  
As such, measures of unknowns and variability can be difficult to discuss and 
integrate within transboundary agreements. Cohen, Norman, and Bakker (Norman et al. 
, 2009, p. 256) therefore  ask ‘Under what conditions the border is an obstacle to or 
facilitator of effective water governance [?]’ and ‘Will our existing institutions be able 
to cope with these dynamic changes, or will innovators need to seek new solutions that 
work around, rather than through, existing arrangements?’  
Conditions for successful transboundary water governance 
From the relatively few case studies available in the academic canon, several 
conditions are seen to be essential for answering these questions and promoting 
successful transboundary water governance, guiding transboundary flood risk 
management. 
• The impact of flooding can be dramatically reduced when 
robust and legitimate institutions manage transnational floods through a 
process of agreed-upon rules and operating procedures (Bakker, 2007; 
Norman & Bakker, 2013).  
• Best practices for transboundary FRM include data 
exchange, clear treaties, harmonized efforts, local knowledge, and trust 
(Norman & Bakker, 2013; Swanenvleugel, 2012).  
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• An integrated setting where stakeholders have a common 
perception of the issues, similar mindsets and responsibilities, can be 
particularly helpful in managing the complexity of issues such as 
uncertainty (Bernauer, 2002; Clamen, 2013).  
• Trusted and adopted scientific evidence and transparent 
information is also necessary to ensure that epistemic uncertainty is 
minimised (National Research Council (U.S.), 2006)  
• Comprehensive ecosystem management can be a 
successful tool for transboundary FRM as this prioritizes natural 
boundaries over international borders, focusing on basin-wide rather than 
national tools for flood risk management (Hildebrand, Pebbles & Fraser, 
2002)  
Despite this theorising and its occasional testing, the necessary cross-border 
cooperation in these matters does not always translate into practice, as is captured by 
Wiering et al.’s (2010:p.2670) term ‘the invisible wall’ between ideas and practice. The 
overarching debate that lingers in all issues of transboundary water governance is 




Flooding in these transboundary contexts is additionally an issue of unbalanced 
interdependence; two levels of tension in its management that pit national and local 
interests against each other, as well as highlight asymmetries in upstream and 
downstream riparian concerns (Wiering et al., 2010).  
Managing expectations between competing domestic and transnational policies 
is a major issue. Competing local interests may come into conflict with international 
treaties, laws, or policies. Indeed, governments tend to make decisions for their 
constituents that put national and regional concerns before international ones, despite 
evidence that this may be detrimental in the long run (Crow & Singh, 2009). 
Additionally, effective flood risk management can mute the effect of flooding 
downstream with whatever mitigating tool is used: for instance, a dam can protect the 
downstream from excess water but will not necessarily help the upstream community. 
As such, downstream riparian communities generally show strong support for 
cooperation in FRM because it can mitigate for them the impacts of the natural hazard. 
Upstream communities, on the other hand, can bear the brunt of responsibility and costs 
when it comes constructing FRM infrastructure, and may not reap the benefits 
(Bernauer, 2002; Wiering et al., 2010).  
Such intersecting discussions about uncertainty and transboundary flood risk 
management have yet to be comprehensively addressed in the existing literature. 
However, Cosens (2010) does identify uncertainty as present in all factors contributing 
to flood hazard and risk (such as climate change, demographics, infrastructure, public 
participation). She argues it as a complexity-inducing variable for transboundary water 
management that it is fundamental to address, notably through governance structures 
and public participation (Cosens, 2010). This requires balancing interests and contexts 
on both sides of an international border, and the case study here exactly matches that 
situation. Whether the cross-border agreements involved should be strengthened or 
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loosened is the dilemma that frames our analysis of these processes in transnational 
flood risk management and its uncertainties. 
Flood risk management in Eastern North America  
All the North American Great Lakes are connected, with water levels in one 
influencing levels in the next. On this hydrological chain, Lake Ontario is the furthest 
east (Figure 1), split in half by the Canadian-USA border separating the Province of 
Ontario and the State of New York. Its outlet is the St. Lawrence River that flows north-
eastwards, eventually crossing into the Province of Quebec (Hudon, 2004; McNeese, 
2005). Communities on the lake and river on both sides of the border experience 
seasonal springtime flooding with significant impacts. Under the jurisdiction of the IJC, 
the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence River Board (ILOSRB) monitors and 
regulates the water flow between Lake Ontario and the St-Lawrence, working with the 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Adaptive Management Board (International Lake 
Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020b).   
 
Structural flood risk management 
In the latter half of the 20th century, water quantity became a concern for 
management of the Great Lakes, mostly led by demand for hydro-electric power and 
shipping routes (Cook, 2014; Venkatesh & Hobbs, 1999). This concern drove structural 
strategies to manage the water quantity needed for these economic activities. In 1952, 
the ILOSRB approved the construction of the Moses-Saunders dam, one of the first 
major hydro-electric structures on the Canadian-American border, a controversial 
project that led to the displacement of 6,500 people (Parham, 2009).   
Today, the dam doubles as a flood management structure: its gates retain the 
flow of water from the lake to the river and thus are used to regulate water levels on 
both sides of the border (International Lake Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020a). 
As explained by the IJC (in this case our ‘planners’) : ‘since 1960, Lake Ontario would 
have set new record high water levels several times without regulation’ (International 
Lake Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020c:p.4). The water quantity structures are 
overseen by the ILOSRB whose staff (our ‘operators’) can increase or decrease outflow 
amounts through the dam through a set of rules that determine appropriate water levels 
on Lake Ontario and the lower St-Lawrence river. When executed  in a timely manner, 
this type of regulation has been particularly useful for downstream flood alleviation 
(International Lake Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020c).  
Two different approaches to managing uncertainty 
Many different strategies can be taken to manage flood risk. The history of structural 
regulation in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River system, leading to Plan 2014, showcases 
the evolution of approaches to this end.  
 
Plan 1958D and strict water level regulation 
In 1963, on-going discussions about the regulation of water quantity through the 
Moses-Saunders dam created Plan 1958-D (hereinafter Plan 58D) that used formal 
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hydrological equations to regulate water heights of the lake and the river2. Lake 
Ontario's outflow was thus determined by two sets of rule curves, seasonal adjustments, 
a number of limitations for reasons of hydropower, ice formation and navigation, as 
well as limitations in the flow changes in order to ensure that ‘downstream flow/levels 
are no greater than would occur without regulation’ (Fay, 2005:p.160). These equations 
set ‘absolute constraints on outflow’ and determined how much water could be released 
by the dam in any given time (Fay, 2005:p.161).   
The predictability attempted by these rules was the result of complex 
transboundary negotiations at the IJC that allowed for clearer management and greater 
political acceptability, notably as desired by shipping companies and hydro-electricity 
producers who depended on predictable water levels (MacFarlane, 2014). However, 
adhering to these rules proved difficult, with the infrastructure struggling to manage 
hydro-climatic variability. Notably during extreme weather conditions, the natural 
fluctuations of the water levels were difficult to contain within the strict bounds allowed 
by the regulation. The operators and their Management Board found that they had too 
often to deviate from the ‘inflexible, date specific’ boundaries set in the Plan 
‘sometimes several times within a week in response to changing conditions’ (Fay, 
2005:p.172). 
In recognition of this problem, the dam's Management Board was given 
discretionary power to deviate from the Plan whenever necessary in order to provide 
‘beneficial effects or relief from adverse effects to one interest without appreciable 
adverse effects to others’ (Fay, 2005:p.161). Over the years, many adjustments to the 
rule curves were attempted, notably in an update in the 1980s through Plan 1958-D with 
Simulated Deviations which allowed the operators a wider range of acceptable high and 
low water levels, and more discretion to release water in case of flood emergencies 
(Fay, 2005). We found little evidence of public scrutiny or criticism of this old 
regulation plan and its variations, perhaps because of its more rigid (and therefore less-
discretionary) rules or because the operators’ problems were not understood or 
appreciated.  
 
A new FRM strategy: Plan 2014. 
Hand in hand with concerns about climate change and ecosystem restoration, 
recent environmental discourse has sought a return to less structured, more natural water 
management strategies including for the regulation of Lake Ontario and the St. 
Lawrence River. Starting in 1998, a new strategy was proposed to manage the levels of 
the Great Lakes in order to ‘meet regulation objectives under a broad range of possible 
future water level conditions’ (International Upper Canada Lakes Study, 2012:p.7). 
Strict regulation of water levels such as those in Plan 1958-D would no longer be 
acceptable.  
                                                 
2 The history of this regulation in fact goes back to 1952 with the ‘1952 Order of Approval’ for the 
Moses-Saunders dam. In July 1958, a working committee began discussing the ‘operation details’ of rule-
based regulation called Plan 1958-A (1960) (International St. Lawrence River Board Of Control Working 
Committee, 1959:p.1) . This document was then refined in quick succession by Plan 1958-C (1962) and 
then by Plan 1958-D in 1963 (International Joint Commission, 2014:pp.9–10).   
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With this shift, after sixteen years of negotiation and 20 million USD spent in 
consultation, Plan 1958 D was replaced by the Regulation Plan 2014 for the Lake 
Ontario and the St. Lawrence River (hereinafter Plan 2014) (International Joint 
Commission, 2014). Clamen and Macfarlane (2018) outline in detail the evolution of 
this regulation. The overarching goal of Plan 2014 is to bring fluctuating water levels 
closer to natural cycles and restoring riparian ecosystems, balancing many competing 
interests (Clamen & Macfarlane, 2018). It promotes a focus on adaptive management to 
identify and manage uncertainty, as well as sets up a coordinated regional climate 
change model to test the specific regulation rules in the face of future uncertainties 
(Clamen & Macfarlane, 2018; International Joint Commission, 2014).  
This type of regulation differs in form and in rationale from the previous 
strategies. Instead of stating the daily absolute water levels, the release rules for the dam 
laid out in Plan 2014 (called the B7 rules) use constantly recalculated algorithms 
reflecting changing daily conditions, and are adjustable on a much wider range of water 
heights. This allows for much lower and higher water levels to be reached in the lake 
and river, thus creating greater flexibility of the control system notably to account for 
extremes and uncertain circumstances. Under this more flexible plan, greater discretion 
is given to the Management Board and the dam operators to deviate from the old rules. 
In the calculations embedded in the plan to be followed by the operators, the B7 rules 
combine short-term hydrological forecasts with longer-term projections and calculations 
of water heights in normal, unregulated conditions to determine the timing and quantity 
of water releases.  When a discharge is seen to exceed normal conditions (greater than 
7,011 m3/s), more water is released based on complex rule curves (International Joint 
Commission, 2014:p.26): differences in weekly releases are addressed by averaging 
monthly short-term water quantity forecasts to smooth the variability of the regulation, 
effectively accelerating the rate of water release when the lake levels are rising.  
The Plan also set an emergency trigger for high water levels in the lake that, if 
reached, provides the Management Board with discretion to ‘provide all possible relief 
to the riparian owners upstream and downstream’ (International Joint Commission, 
2014:p.19). Plan 2014 also tackles climate change uncertainty by allowing the definition 
of extreme water levels to change as ‘normals’ change, stating that ‘the rule curve 
parameters should be updated periodically to account for climate change’ (International 
Joint Commission, 2014:p.28). Later, in their report on the floods in 2019, the ILOSRB 
warned: ‘we know extremes have occurred in the past and we expect they will occur 
again in the future, so we must be better prepared for the next event, even though it is 
difficult to know how soon that will be’ (International Lake Ontario- St. Lawrence 
River Board, 2020a:p.33).  
Through the development of Plan 2014, the IJC has thereby identified two main 
areas of uncertainty about flood risk and water level regulation: 1) ontological 
uncertainty about extreme weather events, given their influence on the operation of the 
new release rules, and 2) epistemic uncertainty as to the accuracy of the models used 
with which to design those rules. As seen in Table 1, the wording of Plan 2014 firmly 
sets uncertainty as a fundamental problem that is to be addressed by this new regulation. 
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Key Flood Events in 2017 and 2019  
The implementation of Plan 2014 was immediately followed by record flood 
seasons in the Springs of 2017 and 2019. It was unfortunate timing for a state-of-the art 
strategy aimed to promote a shift to more effective flood risk management. 
 
Flood outcomes 
Flooding in Great-Lakes and St. Lawrence basin is seasonal: every year, in the 
spring as the snow and ice melts, the basins get saturated and the main water bodies and 
their tributaries overflow their banks. In 2017 and 2019, Spring flooding all along Lake 
Ontario and the St. Lawrence River was at record levels. One of the worst hit cities in 
both the years was Montreal, the first major city on the St. Lawrence River. In 2017, 
more than 400 people had to be evacuated from the city and the immediate emergency 
response over the course of a few days brought costs of over 8 million $CAD to the city 
(Service de sécurité incendie de Montréal/ Direction de la sécurité civile et de la 
résilience, 2017). In 2019, floods are estimated to have cost the city over 17 million 
$CAD (Corriveau, 2020). In New York State’s Rochester, on Lake Ontario, the damage 
from the floods also cost the State hundreds of millions of dollars both in 2017 and 
2019 (Orr, 2018).   
The emergency measures outlined in Plan 2014 guided the flood response in 
both those years. In 2017, the operators and Management Board decided to decrease 
significantly the flow of water out of the lake on the 8th of May, one day after the peak 
impacts were felt in Montreal, and slowly returned it to normal as the highwater level 
receded (Perreaux, 2018). In interviews given in the aftermath, the IJC explained that, if 
it had lowered water levels of Lake Ontario by only one centimetre by releasing more 
water through the dam, this would have raised the water levels near Montreal by a factor 
of ten (Semeniuk, 2017). Similarly, in the autumn of 2018, the water height at the 
Moses-Saunders dam again neared the maximum ‘L-limit’ of Plan 2014 (established as 
the highest possible outflow from the dam). In the early winter, the levels of Lake 
Ontario rose with increased precipitation until ice formation. On the 7th of May 2019, 
water levels reached the high level emergency triggers (Criterion H14) (International 
Lake Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020c:para.2). The Board gave the dam 
operators authority to deviate from the usual regulation ‘in order to continue balancing 
ongoing high water conditions in the lower St. Lawrence River with increasing water 
levels upstream on Lake Ontario and the upper St. Lawrence River’ (International Lake 
Ontario- St. Lawrence River Board, 2020a:p.24).  
 
Political outcomes and public reaction 
The severity of the 2017 and 2019 floods brought the role of the IJC into public 
consciousness, and the reaction to these events demonstrates the tension surrounding 
transboundary flood management in a context of uncertainty and new extremes. 
Concerns that had already arisen regarding the higher water levels allowed by the Plan 
were concretised (Clamen & Macfarlane, 2018) and as the main new element of the 
governance plan, the new flexibility of the release rules was the focus of public debate. 
The divide was encapsulated in this quote from a 2018 news article: ‘The controversy 
over water management and the record floods of 2017 pitted the interests of Americans 
against Canadians, experts against politicians, and property owners against each other, 
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not to mention shipping companies and shoreline wildlife’ (Perreaux, 2018, para.1). 
Table 2 shows further examples of these reactions.  
Upstream, the backlash against Plan 2014 among communities on Lake Ontario 
has been substantial (Clamen & Macfarlane, 2018). In 2019, the State of New York 
even launched a lawsuit against the IJC for 50 million USD in compensation for 
negligence in protecting the interests of New Yorker property owners, stating that the 
IJC ‘failed to increase outflows from Lake Ontario to lower the water levels and abate 
flooding along the Lake Ontario shorefront’ (Berkman, 2019:p.23). The lawsuit 
specifically highlights that 'nothing could be further from the truth' in the IJC's early 
claim that the benefits of Plan 2014 would outweigh the minor increased risk of 
flooding (Berkman, 2019: 2), The first section of the lawsuit describes New York State's 
perception that Plan 2014 and the decisions made within it in 2017 and 2019 were 
unfair; it ends on this paragraph which illustrates particularly well the tensions of 
managing the uncertainty and interdependence of flooding: 
 'The DEC3 recognizes that the water levels on Lake Ontario are in part a 
function of natural conditions, and that to expect the IJC to prevent all flooding—
particularly in the face of climate change—is unrealistic. The DEC also recognizes that 
the IJC must balance multiple factors in managing outflows, including the interests of 
upstream and downstream riparian owners, environmental concerns, and navigation 
and power. But the key word is “balance”. The IJC cannot saddle the (New York) State 
with the brunt of the damage.' (Berkman, 2019: 3).  
 
The New York State is arguing that American law provides an exception to 
sovereign immunity for any claim in which money damages are sought against a foreign 
state, permitting a valid lawsuit against international organisations (such as the IJC), 
allowing them to be sued.  The lawsuit remains unresolved. 
 
Downstream on the Canadian side of the border, arguably less attention has been 
paid to Plan 2014 and the role of the IJC, and emphasis has been placed instead on 
examining changes in extreme weather and urban planning (Table 2). For instance, the 
city of Montreal’s official reports on the 2017 floods show no evidence of work with 
Plan 2014 or the IJC (Service de sécurité incendie de Montréal/ Direction de la sécurité 
civile et de la résilience, 2017). If anything, the plan's flexible regulation had protected 
the city from much higher water levels than occurred in the severe situation that 
occurred; perhaps the more recent floods in 2019 will be catalysts in creating greater 
awareness of the IJC’s importance role in the protection of Montreal.  
Discussion: Tackling uncertainty in transboundary flood risk management 
We have discussed the evolving nature of managing transboundary flood risks 
towards a more flexible approach, and the situation in our case study when new rules 
encapsulating this greater flexibility coincided with major flooding affecting 
communities on both sides of a border. The ‘symbiotic relationship’ of upstream and 
downstream communities here and elsewhere makes equitable flood risk management 
complex (Orr & McDermott, 2017). As Peter Annin, author of the Great Lakes Water 
                                                 
3 The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
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Wars, stated in an interview in 2018: ‘Relief for one community harms another  
community [...] there are no simple solutions’ (Perreaux, 2018:para.18). 
But there can be positives here. The term ‘disaster cooperation’ has been used to 
refer to the notion by which nations can work together in times of crisis - this may be 
particularly true if strong institutions and relationships are already well-established 
(Glantz, 2003; Hannigan, 1976; LeMarquand, 1977). Notably, LeMarquand (1993:p.77) 
indicated  that the IJC’s reputation for impartiality ‘has earned it respect’, and the 
institution has been named as a successful example of transboundary cooperation. 
However, the backlash after the 2017 and 2019 floods exposes two difficulties with 
regard to uncertainty in modern flood risk management to which transboundary 
situations add another layer of complexity; in times of shock, the importance of these 
difficulties can be brought to the forefront as increased pressure is put on local decision 
makers such as dam operators.  
 (1) Tight flood risk management rules are often preferred by local policy 
makers and their lay publics as they create more predictability that is easier to 
understand, accept, and used as vehicles for promoting accountabilities; but  
 (2) Flood risk management systems and rules need to be made flexible in 
order to account for inherent hydro-meteorological uncertainty and the even greater 
uncertainties regarding future risks with climate change. 
 
Two issues are important here. First, animosity between these upstream and 
downstream communities can be particularly complex and strong in transboundary 
contexts where planners are asked to balance the two potentially different local self-
interests of those who may have very different attitudes to risk and uncertainty; for 
instance, the broader political contexts in the US and Canada have differed widely in the 
last few years. Managers and politicians are caught in a delicate balancing act of 
promoting their constituents’ interests, attempting to juggle jurisdictional differences (or 
what Cook (2014) calls ‘fragmentation’) while upholding international principles and 
treaties meant to ensure equity.   
Secondly, structural approaches to flood risk management can pit river basin 
communities against each other, notably because releasing water through dams requires 
an active decision by operators that, whatever it is, will impact communities on both 
sides of the structure and will most likely generate those feelings of unfairness 
discussed by Clamen and Macfarlane (2018) and highlighted here. Considerable 
uncertainty may well surround current and future situations but decisions are needed on 
the operation of interventions today using infrastructures that were designed decades 
ago and may well last another 50 or 100 years. The situation we have described shows a 
break in trust in the governance arrangements (notably in the IJC) by some of the 
affected communities, a distrust of the science behind the flexible plan (which was 
misunderstood), and a pervasive requirement from that public and its politicians for 
greater certainty than the science suggested is possible.  
In these ways, uncertainty puts much socio-political pressure on regulators who 
are expected to interpret hydro-meteorological forecasts and observations and to make 
decisions on mitigation pathways that are fair for all. It is not a given that the public 
accepts even overwhelming scientific evidence or arguments. Additionally, the vocal 
public debate also exemplifies an underlying tension of transboundary governance that 
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we articulated earlier: whether we should make agreements and treaties stricter or 
loosen them. While in the past the role of the IJC has mostly been ignored by the public, 
recent developments propelled the institution into political consciousness; there seems 
to have been little previous understanding of the mechanisms of Plan 2014, its rationale 
of uncertainty, and even its transnational links. In this case, even though the IJC was 
created to balance out self-interest and has for years provided a platform for 
international cooperation, it has now been blamed for the 2017/19 crisis. We can see in 
this respect that the conditions for successful transboundary water governance raised 
earlier in this paper may be necessary but they are not sufficient.  
 
Expert and lay opinion 
The case also illustrates the problem of lay opinion versus expert opinion with 
regards to uncertainty (Table 2), and raises the question of which should dominate FRM 
decision-making.  
If we were to accept that lay opinion should dominate, because communities are 
flooded and losses are incurred while their taxes are paying for FRM, then the evolution 
towards more flexible and adaptive management might have to be reconsidered, because 
these communities seek stability and predictable outcomes. However, as this case study 
shows, predictable flood outcomes are hard to come by given the in-bult uncertainty in 
the phenomenon. There is also no such thing as a monolithic lay opinion on best FRM 
practices, not least owing to the dynamics between upstream and downstream 
communities. The uncertainty that stems from the plurality of opinions and interests is 
another issue faced by decision-makers. 
 If, on the other hand, we make decisions based on scientific results and 
expert opinion about how to manage uncertainty in flood risk management across 
national boundaries, then we should persevere with flexible new rules in anticipation 
that they are best placed with which to manage the uncertainty inherent in the situations 
we observe, and put efforts into building relationships with communities to ensure that 
they are kept abreast of any changes in flood risk management strategies.   
As researchers, we may prefer the latter strategy, but recognise that inherently 
this must involve greater communication between the experts and the lay community 
than has occurred hitherto, to explain the complexity of the situation, if we are to 
counter any of the inevitable public backlash when floods occur that expert opinion 
might not or could not have anticipated. 
 
Planners and operators 
Decision-makers must be accountable and able to justify their actions based on 
the best available science.  
Our example also illustrates that if we accept that increasing the flexibility of 
regulation is the best tool to deal with uncertainty, this means we are also shifting some 
responsibility for decision-making further away from the planners and closer to those 
implementing the rules: the operators. With more rigid regulations, the planners are 
accountable for the outcomes which they shape. The more flexible the regulations, the 
more this responsibility moves to those implementing and interpreting the rules. These 
operators therefore become more susceptible to criticism of their decisions, and more 
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likely to experience political and public backlash, local lobbying and political influence, 
leading to unforeseen consequences and reactions.  
Within the transboundary institution whose role is already to balance the 
interests of all involved by the management of  flood risk (in our case the IJC) it may be 
necessary to bolster clear and agreed inter-nation liability parameters and their 
associated dispute resolution mechanisms, recognising the positions of both the planners 
and the operators.  
 
Communicating uncertainty for transboundary cooperation  
The effectiveness of transboundary flood risk management relies on adequate 
communication by decision-makers (i.e. planners and operators, in our context) and the 
continued success of transboundary institutions.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
fully examine the public communication surrounding Plan 2014, but two insights do 
emerge from the story.   
First, effective cooperation requires sufficient information and its 
communication; all parties must have enough information about the situation and its 
uncertainties in order for them to trust and therefore support any decisions made. This is 
not easy. In our case, public backlash to Plan 2014 shows evidence that public 
understanding of flood risk's hydrometeorological uncertainty and of the role of the 
regulators is lacking. That uncertainty is a particularly complex concept for the public to 
grasp, as a large canon of literature records. This difficulty has been highlighted in the 
Great Lakes themselves in fact, for example in Chao et al (1999) which compares 
different tools to communicate climatic uncertainty in the basin.  
Secondly, for transboundary cooperation to be effective, information held and 
interpreted on both sides of the border also must be symmetrical, to promote  mutual 
confidence (Bernauer (2002); Durth (1996)). Again, this is not easy. There have clearly 
been different interpretations of Plan 2014 between the Canadian and American public 
and governments. This suggests asymmetries in the understanding and political framing 
of the regulation and of the responsibilities of the IJC's planners and the dam operators, 
leading inter alia to the lawsuit that we have described and our  concern that future 
flooding incidents will face the same complexities and lead to further disputes. 
 
Social and political uncertainty 
This story additionally allows us to expand our definitions of uncertainty: there 
is great social and political uncertainty regarding flooding, in people's reactions and in 
institutions' responses, overlaid on epistemic and ontological uncertainty contained in 
the hazard itself (cf. Penning-Rowsell and Korndewal, 2018).  Parallels can be made 
here between Clamen and Macfarlane's (2018) argument that the IJC's strategic error 
might have been to ignore the non-technical aspects of FRM and Hall's (2014) caution 
about the importance of using judgement in potentially contentious situations dominated 
by uncertainty. As such, not only is flexibility in structural flood risk management 
necessary to address uncertainty, but accountability and flexibility in the managing 
institution may also be particularly important. Under more flexible systems, decision-
makers such as dam operators may be more often challenged, and there is a need for 
liability to be pre-delimited and disputes moderated, and in transboundary contexts it 
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would always be preferable that these accountability mechanisms lie outside of national 
legal systems.  
Further case studies of cross-border flooding situations from other international 
contexts could enhance our understanding of these many dimensions and help formulate 
recommendations, as would longitudinal analyses of the story surrounding Plan 2014 as 
this will continue to develop and be discussed in the future.       
Conclusions 
The case of Plan 2014 and recent floods in the Lake Ontario/St. Lawrence River 
system exemplifies how uncertainty can exacerbate the complexity of transboundary 
flood risk management.  
Here, and elsewhere, creating flexibility in the operation of structural and related 
other FRM measures is one way to address this hydro-meteorological uncertainty and 
prepare for a range of future flooding scenarios. However, with this strategy, 
transboundary water managers must negotiate different and difficult socio-political 
tensions, notably the need to balance the public demand for predictability as well as risk 
reduction, protecting both upstream and downstream communities as much as possible 
from the impacts of flooding. The roles of different actors will change, with 
sometimes unpredictable consequences. This reinforces the need for the delicate 
balance we are advocating, here between planner and operator, notably through 
increased transparency supported by proper and agreed and implementable dispute 
resolution processes.  
The theoretical underpinnings of Plan 2014, both in its institutional structure and 
rationale, might have held the ingredients for a successful flood management tool. In 
practice, however, the public’s reaction suggests tensions can exist no matter how 
grounded in expertise is the decision making, pressures which are heightened in periods 
of crisis. The case study reveals in stark detail the multiple tensions concerning adaptive 
management of episodic events such as flooding: there is no ‘silver bullet’ here.  
What is necessary, however, in these and similar situations internationally, is for 
this approach towards greater flexibility to recognise the need for clear and appropriate 
rules for the operation of flood risk management interventions. Better communication of 
the need for flexibility and the possible increased risk to members of the public is also 
necessary. Additionally, clear scientific attribution of the causes of any damaging event 
must be communicated, so that false interpretations of the merits of flexibility are 
minimised. One way forward may be to ensure that the relevant institutions - like the 
IJC - are properly equipped to make expert decisions transparently and independently 
from political considerations, whilst remaining accountable to communities on both 
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Figure 1. The Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River Basin (Map courtesy IJC, 2018, 
https://ijc.org/en/great-lakes-st-lawrence-river) 
 
 
 
